

Overview (1)

- Introduction
- Goal
- Cryptography Overview
 - Symmetric cryptography
 - Modes of encryption
 - ECB: Electronic Code Book
 - OFB: Output Feed Back
 - CFB: Cipher Feed Back
 - CBC: Cipher Block Chaining
 - Padding before encryption
 - Secret Key $\leftrightarrow$ Public Key


Overview (2)

- Key-Agreement
 - Diffie-Hellman Key-Agreement Protocol
 - One Way Functions
 - Modular Exponentiation
- Secret Key derivation
- Public Key Cryptography
 - Secret Key $\leftrightarrow$ Public Key
 - RSA Public Key Algorithm
- Data Authentication
 - Hash Functions
 - MDC: Hash function without key
 - MAC: Hash function with Secret Key
 - retail MAC: MAC based on Block Cipher

Overview (3)

- Digital Signature
 - Digital Signature with RSA
- Station to Station Protocol
- Protocol Details: Key agreement
- Protocol Details: Data Broadcast
- Expectations
- References


Introduction



Goal

- Setup a secure bidirectional communication channel between DSP₁ and DSP₂
- Secure: data integrity and confidentiality are guaranteed
- DSP₂ only processes information successfully checked
- Confidentiality: Encryption (AES in CBC mode)
- Integrity: retail-MAC based on the AES
- Secret keys (shared keys) negotiated through key agreement
- MAC and encryption keys are derived from the shared secret (after application of hash function SHA-1)
- Digital signatures for the authenticated key agreement use RSA

Protocol stack



Protocol Details: Key agreement

- | DSP 1 | DSP 2 |
|--|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1: Send PING <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – get input: x, Priv₁, Pub₁, Pub₂ – compute msg: $\alpha^x \bmod p$ – send msg • 4: Receive PONG <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – get msg – check signature – compute shared secret: $(\alpha^y)^x \bmod p$ – derive secret keys | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2: Receive PING <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – get msg ($\alpha^x \bmod p$) • 3: Send PONG <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – get input: y, Priv₂, Pub₁, Pub₂ – compute shared secret: $(\alpha^x)^y \bmod p$ – derive secret keys – compute msg: $E_{ENC}(S_{Priv2}(\alpha^y, \alpha^x)) \alpha^y$ – send msg |

Protocol Details: First Data Cell of the Data Broadcast

- First data message sent from DSP₁ to DSP₂ contains in the data field:
 - $E_{ENC}(\text{Data} || S_{Priv1}(\alpha^x, \alpha^y))$
- Next data messages will only contain $E_{ENC}(\text{Data})$ in that field.

Protocol Details: Data Broadcast

- | DSP 1 | DSP 2 |
|---|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 5: Get data (from the A/D converter) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> pad the data encrypt the padded data compute MAC on the encrypted data 6: Send data to the communication layer | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 7: Receive data from the communication layer <ul style="list-style-type: none"> check integrity (MAC) decrypt data strip padding 8: Provide data to the D/A converter |

Implementation Hints: Suggested message format

- 4 types of messages
- Structure TLV (Type, Length, Value)

1 byte	2 bytes	N bytes	
Type	Length	Value	
PING	1	$\alpha^x \bmod p$	→
PONG	2	$E(S) \parallel \alpha^y \bmod p$	←
1st Data msg	3	$E(D \parallel S) \parallel \text{MAC}$	→
rest Data msgs	4	$E(D) \parallel \text{MAC}$	→

Key agreement: μC_1

- gives to DSP₁ the input needed for the key agreement (x, RSA key pair, RSA public key of DSP₂)
- DSP₁: compute message₁ = $S_{\text{Priv1}}(\alpha^x \bmod p)$
- DSP₁: send message₁
- DSP₁: wait for message₂
- DSP₁: validate message₂ (public key of DSP₂)
- DSP₁: generate secret: $\text{sec}_{\text{DH}} = \alpha^{xy} \bmod p$

Key agreement: μC_2

- gives to DSP₂ the input needed for the key agreement (y, RSA key pair, RSA public key of DSP₁)
- DSP₂: wait for message₁
- DSP₂: validate message₁ (public key DSP₁)
- DSP₂: compute message₂ = $S_{\text{Priv2}}(\alpha^y \bmod p)$
- DSP₂: generate secret: $\text{sec}_{\text{DH}} = \alpha^{xy} \bmod p$
- DSP₂: send message₂

Key agreement: shared secret

- $\text{sec}_{\text{DH}} = \alpha^{xy} \bmod p$
- 2 secret keys are derived from the shared secret [$H(\bullet) = \text{SHA-1}$]:
 - Encryption key (confidentiality protection):
 - $\text{sec}_{\text{ENC}} = H(\text{sec}_{\text{DH}} \parallel 0x0F) \rightarrow E_{\text{ENC}}(\bullet)$
 - MAC-Key (integrity protection):
 - $\text{sec}_{\text{MAC}} = H(\text{sec}_{\text{DH}} \parallel 0xF0) \rightarrow M_{\text{MAC}}(\bullet)$
 - MAC is computed on the encrypted information

Secure broadcast: μC_1

- DSP₁: produce *Padded* = Data || padding
- DSP₁: compute the ciphertext:
 $E(\text{sec}_{\text{ENC}})(\text{Padded})$
- DSP₁: compute the MAC (using sec_{MAC}) on the ciphertext
- DSP₁: broadcast info to DSP₂



Secure broadcast: μC_2

- When DSP₂ receives information:
 - Retrieve the MAC-Key
 - Compute the MAC on the incoming info
 - Compare the computed MAC and the incoming MAC
 - IF both MACs have the same value:
 - DSP₂: Decrypt information (using sec_{ENC})
 - DSP₂: Validate padded information
 - IF ok, info ready for further processing

Expectations

- Ansi-C implementations of **AES** and **SHA-1** are **provided**
- IMPLEMENTATION of:
 - **Protocols**: **key agreement** and **data broadcast**
 - **Retail MAC** based on AES
 - **General modular exponentiation** (Diffie-Hellman and RSA)
 - **Padding** (adding and stripping)
 - **Encryption/Decryption** in **CBC mode**

References

- The handbook of applied cryptography (A. Menezes, P. van Oorschot, S. A. Vanstone)
- Lecture Notes on cryptography (B. Preneel)
- Google
- {Claudia.Diaz, Siddika.BernaOrs, Danny.Decock} @esat.kuleuven.ac.be,
- Offices: 01.65, 01.66, 01.67